many [elsewhere], and we have explained that (1) “composition,” “dependence,” “part,” and “other” are equivocal and ambiguous terms, and that none of them is entailed in the sense that proof has shown must be denied. Rather, they are entailed only in a sense that is not *) (2) negated by proof but is, in fact, affirmed by it.

The point here (3) is that a cause which necessitates its effect by virtue of its essence is false if interpreted in this way. But if such a cause is interpreted [as] (4) one that necessitates its effect through its will and power, this meaning does not conflict with His being a voluntary agent. Rather, He would be a voluntary agent and a cause that necessitates by virtue of His essence—His essence being one that acts, possesses power, and chooses—and He necessitates through His will and power.

Once it is clear that “a cause which necessitates by virtue of its essence” admits of two meanings—one of which does not conflict with His being an agent by His will [and power] (5) (5 while the other conflicts with His being an agent by His will and power 5) (6)—then those who say, “A capable agent acts only as a matter of possibility”—as certain members of the Qadariyya and Jahmiyya maintain—regard voluntary action as incompatible with necessitation and hold that the two cannot coexist (7) in any respect.

They say: “A capable, voluntary agent cannot be capable [and voluntary] (8) unless he acts as a matter of possibility rather than necessity.”