Sīnā and those like him introduced it. For this reason, Abū al-Barakāt [the author of al-Mutabar] (1) did not rely upon it. Among these thinkers, he was one of the most inclined to follow sound proof according to his own reasoning and to depart from blindly following their predecessors—even though the foundation (2) of their enterprise and philosophy is that matters of reason admit no blind imitation.

Moreover, if only one thing proceeds [from Him] (3)—as they maintain regarding the First Intellect—then, if that first emanation is one in every respect, it necessarily follows that only one thing can proceed from it, and so on indefinitely. But if it possesses some plurality in any respect—and that plurality has positive existence—then more than one thing has proceeded (4) from the First. If, however, that plurality is privative, no existent can proceed from it; thus, not even one thing can proceed from the first emanation.

As for their argument for this claim, they say:

“If two things proceeded from Him, the source of the one would differ from the source of the other (5), which would entail composition.”

The first response is this: Things do not proceed from the Creator as heat proceeds from fire. Rather, He acts by will and choice. Even if the source were presumed to be multiple, this would merely be a plurality of relational matters; and multiple relations and negations are, by common agreement, affirmed of Him. Even if it were presumed to be a plurality of attributes, this would entail affirming the existence of attributes—and that is true.

As for their assertion that this is composition and that composition (* is impossible, we have demonstrated [its invalidity] on grounds