more entitled to govern than he was, or that he was among those (1) through whom others guilty of injustice received assistance, the evil averted by his governorship would have been greater than the evil it caused.

How can the taking of wealth and the advancement of certain men compare with the killing of those slain at Siffīn, which brought neither honor nor victory?!

This and other considerations show that those who advised the Commander of the Faithful were prudent. ‘Alī was an imam who exercised independent judgment and did only what he considered beneficial.

The point, however, is that had he known what would happen, he would have known that retaining Mu‘āwiya as governor was better for him than the war at Siffīn, which only increased and multiplied the evil and produced no benefit whatsoever. Mu‘āwiya’s governorship brought more good and less evil than waging war against him. Whatever evil might be thought to arise from his governorship, an even greater evil arose from fighting him.

This and many similar examples demonstrate the ignorance of those who say that ‘Alī knew future events. Indeed, the Rāfidah make contradictory claims: they attribute knowledge of the unseen to him despite these circumstances that contradict it. They also attribute such courage to him that they claim he was the one who supported the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—in his military campaigns, and that it was he who established (2) Islam by his sword in its early days, when Islam was weak.

Then they describe his inability to oppose Abū Bakr—may Allah be pleased with him—despite Abū Bakr’s weakness, as they see it, after the Prophet’s death—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—in terms that contradict this; for