Al-Ash'arī agrees with them in substance, saying: “The servant has no power (1) capable of producing any effect.” He affirms something that he calls power, yet treats its existence as equivalent to its nonexistence. The same applies to the acquisition that he affirms.

These people cannot (2) argue against the Qadariyya’s position on the grounds that the servant’s acting rather than refraining must have a determining factor—as al-Rāzī and a group of the Jabriyya do. This is why al-Ash'arī and his early followers did not advance this argument.

A group of people—such as al-Rāzī and his followers—when debating the Mu'tazila on questions of divine decree, reject this principle and demonstrate (3) that an act must come into existence when the complete determining factor is present, and that it cannot occur without the complete determining factor. They maintain (4) that a capable, voluntary agent does not select one of two possible acts over the other except through the [complete] determining factor (5).

Yet when they debate the philosophers concerning the temporal origination of the universe, the affirmation of a voluntary agent, and the refutation of their doctrine of a cause that necessitates its effect by virtue of its essence, they adopt the approach of the Mu'tazila and the Jahmiyya, claiming that a capable, voluntary agent selects one of two possible acts over the other without any determining factor. As a rule, you will find those who follow the approach of Abū Abd Allah ibn al-Khatīb (6) and those like him (7) contradicting themselves in precisely this way.