and Abū al-Hasan ibn al-Zāghūnī (1), among others (2)—maintain (3) that it is impossible for there to exist (4) a contingent being that subsists in itself yet cannot be pointed to. They thus demonstrated the falsity of the claim that such immaterial entities exist in external reality. Some of them, however, denied altogether the existence of anything that cannot be pointed to, while others denied this only with respect to contingent beings.

Among the benefits derived from the method we have established are avoiding the affirmation of temporal origination without a newly occurring cause, and avoiding the denial of those attributes and acts of Allah that subsist in His Essence.

Another benefit is that this method constitutes a manifest proof of the falsity of the view that the world, or any part of it, is eternal. It also contains the answer (5) to their principal argument.

A further benefit is that it establishes the desired conclusion without any need to distinguish between a cause that produces its effect necessarily by virtue of its essence and an agent who acts by choice. Many speculative thinkers among the Muʿtazila and the Shia have erred in distinguishing between the two. Consequently, many people, such as al-Rāzī and others like him, have become inconsistent on this issue: at times they agree with the Muʿtazila regarding this distinction, and at other times they oppose them. When they oppose them, they vacillate between the adherents of the Sunnah and the philosophers who follow Aristotle.

The basis of the matter is that we know that a capable, voluntary agent acts by his will and power. But must the effect necessarily come into existence whenever decisive will and complete power are present, or not?