The impossibility of a necessary consequence entails the impossibility of that which entails it, although the latter is impossible because of something else, not in itself.

As the Muslims say:

“Whatever Allah wills comes to be, and whatever He does not will does not come to be.”

Thus, whatever [Allah] wills must (1) come to be by virtue of His will, not in itself. Whatever He does not will cannot come to be—not because it is impossible in itself, but because it can come to be only through His will. Therefore, if He does not will it, it cannot come to be.

On this supposition, one of two alternatives must therefore hold: either the object willed accompanies [the will] (2), or it is impossible in itself or because of something else. This shows that if anything in the world could be beginningless, it would necessarily (3 be beginningless because it must 3) (3) accompany Him in pre-eternity. For the supposition is that either accompaniment must be necessary or the object willed must be impossible. If the object willed were possible in pre-eternity, its accompaniment would necessarily follow (4). Yet such necessary accompaniment is impossible, because, as explained above, it would entail that no temporal event could occur.

The other alternative must therefore hold: namely, the impossibility in pre-eternity of any particular object willed. This is what was to be proved.

If, however, it is said that the object willed must come after the will—as many (5) of the theologians say [this]—then, on the supposition that He is one who wills, nothing in the world can be beginningless. This is what was to be proved.

It has thus become clear, on every supposition, that everything other than Allah is temporally originated. This is what was to be proved.

Know that whoever understands this line of reasoning (6) will derive several conclusions from it: