existence, and that it is distinguished from it only by the negation of positive features.

Perfection lies in existence, not in nonexistence, for pure nonexistence contains no perfection. It would therefore be distinguished from contingent beings by the negation of every perfection, whereas they would be distinguished from it by the affirmation of every perfection.

This is the utmost possible exaltation of contingent beings in perfection and existence, coupled with describing necessary existence in terms of deficiency and nonexistence.

Moreover, this existence, which differs from all else only through privative features (1), cannot exist in external reality; rather, it can exist only in the mind. For if it shares with all other existent beings in the meaning denoted by “existence,” then it is universal, and existence can be universal only in the mind, not in external reality. Purely privative features do not entail its actual existence (2) in external reality. Indeed, because external realities are negated of what exists in the mind, it is more properly stripped of them (3) than is what exists externally—assuming that such a thing were possible in external reality; how, then, when it is impossible?

Since the universal exists only in the mind, and a privative qualification does not prevent it from being universal, it follows that it does not exist in external reality.

Furthermore, what exists in external reality must be determinate and possess an existence particular to it. Whatever is not such can exist only in the mind.