existent that is itself (1) present in one particular instance and is itself present in another particular instance; for this (2) is contrary to both sense perception and reason.

The point here is that Avicenna’s position is that existence which is necessary in itself is existence qualified by the negation of all affirmative determinations—not by making it qualified (3) through negating both members of a contradictory pair or by refraining from attributing either of them, as al-Sijistānī and those like him among the Qarmatians [and others] (4) did.

Avicenna formulated their position as existence qualified in that it does not accrue to any reality or quiddity; (* for they believe that existence accrues to contingent beings, while he says: “The Necessary Being’s existence is identical with its quiddity.” The majority of Ahl al-Sunnah say the same. The difference between his view and theirs, however, is that for him the Necessary Being is absolute existence, subject to the negation of quiddities *) (5) with respect to Him. Thus, He has no quiddity apart from existence as qualified by negation.

As for the prophets, their followers, and the great majority of rational people, they know that Allah has a reality unique to Him, which resembles (6) no other reality, and that this reality exists.

One group among the Mu'tazila and those who agree with them say that this reality exists by virtue of an existence superadded to it.