the world is impossible, whether the will is said to be beginningless or temporally originated, or whether one part of it is beginningless and another temporally originated.

If it is said that the object willed may accompany the will or may come after it, then, on this supposition, the entire (1) world may come into being through a beginningless, eternal will without anything new arising. This is the position of the Kullābiyya and those who agree with them among the Ashʿariyya, the Karrāmiyya, the jurists affiliated with the four imams, and others. On this supposition, temporal events may occur without a newly occurring cause, and one of two identical possibilities may be preferred over the other solely by the beginningless will. This supposition therefore invalidates the argument of those who maintain that the world is beginningless.

They adopted this position only because they believed an infinite regress of effects to be invalid and a beginningless series of temporal events to be impossible. If what they say is true—namely, that a beginningless series of temporal events is impossible—then it necessarily follows that the world is temporally originated, and the claim that it is beginningless becomes untenable, for nothing in it exists without being accompanied by some temporal event. Even the intellects and souls, according to those who affirm their existence, must, in their view, be accompanied by temporal events. Thus, if a beginningless series of temporal events is impossible, then whatever does not precede those events is on the same footing as they are: its being beginningless is impossible just as theirs is.

If, however, what these people say is false, the perpetual succession of temporal events is possible. On this supposition, the object willed may accompany the will (2) in beginninglessness, while nothing can come into being except through a newly occurring cause. It would then be impossible for anything (3) in the world to be beginningless, even if it is possible that—