from the other by virtue of reality or quiddity (1), that would be tantamount to saying: “They share in quiddity or reality (2), while one of them differs from the other by virtue of existence or necessity (3).”

If you say, “They share only in general, universal existence, while each is distinguished by the reality particular to it,” it may be replied: “Likewise, it may be said that they share only in general, universal reality, while each is distinguished by the existence particular to it.” There would then be no difference between what you have deemed universal and common (4), such as genus and common accident, and what you have deemed specific, distinguishing, and particular, such as differentia and property.

Rather, you have taken two things that are equal in generality and specificity, considering one in its state of generality and the other in its state of specificity. This is merely your own supposition. Otherwise, either of them may be conceived just as the other may be. As things actually are, each is equal to the other in generality and specificity and in being common and distinguishing. Thus, as things actually are, there is no difference between what you have made a genus or common accident and what you have made a differentia or property, except that you have supposed one of two equals to be general and the other specific.

Second, it may be said: If you say, “The two existing things share in what is denoted by existence, so there must be some further factor by which one is distinguished from the other,” it may be replied to you: “The distinguishing factor may itself be a particular existence (5). Why, then, do you say that it