Those who claimed that anyone who says, “The existence of each thing is identical with its existing reality,” is merely asserting that the term is used equivocally reasoned as follows: If we regard “existence” as a general, univocal term, whether it applies equally or in differing degrees (1)—the latter being called gradational terms—and say that existence is divided into the necessary and the possible, and into the eternal and the originated, then the two kinds share in what is denoted by existence, which is an unrestricted universal. Each of the two must therefore be distinguished from the other by something peculiar to it—namely, a reality. It follows that each must have a reality other than existence.

Consequently, one who maintains that a thing existing outside the mind is nothing other than the reality existing outside the mind cannot say that the term “existence” encompasses both. Rather, he must say that it is predicated of both equivocally.

This is an error through which various groups, including al-Rāzī and those like him, have gone astray.

This can be shown in three ways:

First, it may be said that the term “existence” is like the terms “reality,” “quiddity,” “essence,” and “self.” If you say that existence is divided into the necessary and the possible, or into the eternal and the originated, this is equivalent to saying that reality is divided into the necessary and the possible, or into the eternal and the originated. It is also equivalent to saying that essence is divided into this, that, and the other, while quiddity is divided into this and that, and to similar statements involving general terms. It is likewise equivalent to saying that a thing is divided into the necessary and the possible, and into the eternal and the originated.

Accordingly, if you say that the two share in existence or necessity (2), while one of them differs