and the existence of the other is peculiar to it. Yet an attribute of one created being may resemble an attribute of another, and whatever is possible for one of two like things is possible for the other.

As for the Lord—Glorified and Exalted—nothing whatsoever is His equal in any of His attributes. Indeed, the disparity between Him and each one of His creatures with respect to attributes is greater than the disparity between the greatest and the lowliest of created beings. As for the general, universal meaning held in common, it—as we have stated—exists as a universal only in the mind.

If the two things characterized by it have some kind of agreement, commonality, and resemblance in this respect, there is nothing objectionable in that. For it is the case (1) that Allah is characterized by whatever necessity, possibility, or impossibility follows from that common element. Thus, with respect to an existent insofar as it exists—or one who knows or lives—whatever is said to follow from it by way of necessity, impossibility, or possibility, Allah is described by it. This is not so with a created being’s existence, life, and knowledge, for Allah is not described by what is peculiar to a created being in terms of necessity, possibility, and impossibility, just as a created being is not described by what is peculiar to the Lord in terms of necessity, possibility, and impossibility.

Whoever understands this will find many difficulties resolved—difficulties over which many intelligent people who investigate the universal sciences and knowledge concerning divine matters stumble. This, then, is one of their positions concerning necessary existence: it is the absolute, with the stipulation that it be unqualified by either negation or affirmation. Of their positions, this is the most thoroughgoing in doctrinal negation and deviation.

The second is the view of Ibn Sīnā and his followers: that it is existence qualified (* by negative qualifications