but it may nevertheless be said [that] (1) a newly occurring will is accompanied by its object, just as they say that a newly occurring power is accompanied by its object, although some people dispute this.

[The Three Possibilities Regarding the Object Willed Accompanying the Will]

The point here is that if it is held that the will must be accompanied by its object (2), [that] (3) constitutes evidence that everything other than Allah is temporally originated. If it is held that its object may accompany it or may fail to accompany it, or if it is held that its object cannot accompany it, then under all three possibilities everything other than Allah must be temporally originated.

As for (4) the possibility that the object willed must accompany the will, if the will were beginningless, all objects willed would necessarily be beginningless, and nothing would come into being. This contradicts sensory perception and direct observation. This is like our statement: if He were, by His essence, a beginningless necessitating agent (5), or a complete cause of His effect, then everything He necessarily produces and all His effects would necessarily accompany Him from eternity, making it impossible for anything to come into being from Him.

If, however, there is a newly occurring will, then the argument (6) concerning it is the same as the argument concerning other temporally originated things: it would be impossible for it to arise from that beginningless will whose object must accompany it; and it would likewise be impossible for it to arise without a will or a newly occurring cause.

It has thus become clear that, if the object willed must accompany the will, the beginninglessness of anything within—