—its being singled out for beginninglessness by virtue of its own essence rather than the other, especially since the existence of a thing has no reality apart from the existent established in the external world. Its reality therefore cannot necessitate anything before that reality itself exists. But the Creator [Most High] (1) knows what He wills to do, and it is His knowledge and will that necessitate this specification.

It has thus become clear that if a particular effect’s accompanying the Agent eternally, without beginning or end, is impossible or constitutes an imperfection, then it is impossible for anything in the world to be beginningless. How much more so when both conclusions are established: it is impossible, and even supposing it possible, it constitutes an imperfection? For the beginninglessness of its kind is more perfect than the beginninglessness of that particular instance, and is more readily deemed possible. If it is more readily possible as well as more perfect, its contrary cannot instead be the possible one. Once that is ruled out, the beginninglessness of anything in the world is ruled out.

Accordingly, everything they say about the perpetuity of the Lord’s agency is an argument against them. Agency with respect to a kind is more perfect than agency with respect to a particular individual, and this is what [a person] (2) attests to with certainty and through sense perception. For we witness agency with respect to a kind, one thing after another. If perpetual agency is possible, this mode is possible, for it actually exists. Yet we have no knowledge of perpetual agency directed toward any one particular thing. Thus, our knowledge that agency is perpetual does not in any way entail the perpetuity of any particular thing. The perpetuity of the kind entails that its individual instances come into being. Everything other than Allah is therefore temporally originated, having come into being after it did not exist—which is precisely the conclusion sought. It is thus clear that the claim that what He wills accompanies Him (3) in pre-eternity is impossible, for it precludes temporally originated things from proceeding from Him.

This does not require saying:

“A newly occurring will is not accompanied by its object,”