parted ways with him and renounced the general tenets (1) of his school. Although he retained some of its foundational principles, he opposed al-Jubbā’ī’s denial of the divine attributes and adopted Ibn Kullāb’s approach to them. He also disagreed with the Mu‘tazilah concerning the divine decree and questions of faith, designations, and rulings. Indeed, he went further in refuting them on these matters than Husayn al-Najjār, Dirār ibn ‘Amr, and others like them, who—like the majority of jurists and hadith scholars—occupied an intermediate position on this subject. He went so far in this respect as to incline toward Jahm’s position. He also opposed them concerning the divine threat of punishment, adopted the position of the Muslim community, and aligned himself with the school of the adherents of hadith and the Sunnah, such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal and those like him. This was what he became known for among the people.

As for the part of his doctrine that merits praise, (it is that in which he agreed with the adherents of the Sunnah and hadith, such as the comprehensive formulations. By contrast, the part of his doctrine that merits censure is that in which he agreed with those who oppose the Sunnah and hadith, including the Mu‘tazilah, the Murji’ah, the Jahmiyyah, the Qadariyyah, and others of their kind. He learned the doctrine of the hadith scholars from) (2) Zakariyyā ibn Yahyā al-Sājī in Basra (3), as well as from a group in Baghdad comprising disciples of Ahmad and others. In al-Maqālāt, he stated what he believed to be the doctrine of the adherents of the Sunnah and hadith, saying (4): “We affirm everything we have related of their doctrine, and it is the position we adopt.”