potential, and so it cannot be actual. There is thus no perfection in its determinate effect being concomitant with it, whether this is impossible or is a deficiency contrary to the perfection necessarily belonging to it. This is especially so since it is known that bringing the genus of effects into being, one after another, is more perfect than for any one of them to be concomitant with the Agent (1), beginningless along with Him (2).

On both suppositions, therefore, this must be denied of the essence. There can consequently be no effect belonging to Him (3) that is concomitant with it; hence nothing in the world is beginningless. This is the point to be established. This is an independent proof derived (4) from the principle of the perfection necessarily belonging to Him and His transcendence (5) above deficiency.

This may be further clarified as follows:

It is necessarily known that bringing one effect after another into being without end is more perfect than producing only a single effect inseparable from His essence—assuming that this is possible. Since the former is more perfect, it is possible (6), for the premise is that the essence is capable of producing one thing after another; indeed, this must be so for it. Since this is possible—and indeed necessary for it—the essence must be characterized by it rather than by its opposite, which is less perfect. Nor does this strip it of action; rather, it characterizes it by action in the most perfect manner.

This is explained by the fact that the determinate act and the determinate effect concomitant with it, beginninglessly and forever, must either be possible or impossible. If this is impossible, then the beginninglessness of—