Even if this effect is assumed to be distinct from those effects, it is necessarily accompanied by them: it cannot exist without them, nor can they exist except through it. The two are thus mutually concomitant. If the effects mutually entail one another, then the acts producing them and the wills pertaining to them must all the more so mutually entail one another.

Each of the three beginningless things—the determinate will (1), its act, and its effect—would therefore necessarily (2) be accompanied by infinitely many temporal events.

The essence, in its act of producing the determinate effect, would then be a complete, beginningless cause necessitating that effect; yet with respect to all other temporal events, it would not be a beginningless cause, for its agency and complete necessitation would arise successively.

The essence is described as possessing the utmost possible perfection. If its perfection consists in everything potential within it being actual—without regard to whether this is possible or to the fact (3) that perpetually bringing things into being is more perfect than nothing arising from it, as these philosophers may say—then necessarily nothing would arise from it (* at all, nor would any temporal event exist. But if its perfection consists in bringing one thing *) (4) after another—because that is more perfect than for it to [not] (5) be able to bring one thing after another into being; because action is an attribute of perfection and is conceivable only in this manner; because temporal events perpetually coming into being is more perfect than nothing coming into being; and because what is potential here is the genus of action, while this genus is perpetually actual—

As for every effect, or any one of the effects, being beginningless, this is not—