be concomitant with the beginningless will whose object was concomitant with it (1). If, however, it came into being without that will, temporal events would necessarily come into being without His will. This would entail that temporal events could occur without His will, and He would therefore not be an agent acting by choice. For if the temporal will were His act, it would have come into being without any will; and if it were not His act, something temporal would have come into being without His action. This is impossible. It is also among the matters for which the great majority criticized the Basran Muʿtazilites, because they maintained that Allah’s will comes into being without another will and that His will (2) subsists in no locus.

If it is said:

“Rather, wills pertaining to temporal events have always subsisted in Him,”

as is maintained by those hadith scholars and philosophers who say:

“He has always spoken whenever He wills and has always acted as He wills,”

it is replied:

“On this supposition, there is no beginningless will directed toward a beginningless effect.”

If it is said:

“Both of these coexist in Him,”

it is replied:

“This is impossible because a particular, determinate effect of an agent—especially an agent acting by choice—cannot be inseparable from him; because an effect produced through will must be preceded by the will, which must remain until that effect comes into being—indeed (3), this applies to every effect; and because when successive wills subsist in someone, their objects are likewise successive, as are his acts that subsist in him, while those (4) wills would be among the necessary concomitants of his essence—”