unless something arises from it. Yet it is impossible that nothing should arise from the agent of the universe. It is therefore impossible for Him to have been a necessitating cause by His very essence from eternity.

[The Differing Positions Concerning the Will of Allah Most High]

If it is said:

“He wills by means of a beginningless will concomitant with its object, namely, the universe; or its object, namely, the events occurring within the universe, comes after it (1),”

the same argument applies. For if He had [only] (2) a beginningless will concomitant with its object (3), it would be impossible for temporal events to proceed from Him. Yet it is impossible that temporal events should not proceed from Him. It is therefore impossible that He should have [only] (4) a beginningless will concomitant with its object.

Moreover, a will directed toward effects necessarily concomitant with the agent is inconceivable (5). Rather, the only intelligible conception of an agent acting through his volitions is that he does (6) one thing after another.

For this reason, no one has said:

“The Lord (7) speaks by His will and power, while the particular, determinate speech within His power is beginningless and inseparable from His essence.”

If this is inconceivable with respect to something within His power that subsists in Him, how could it be conceivable with respect to something distinct from Him?

If it is said:

“He has a beginningless will concomitant with its object, and another will that comes into being [along with the temporal events] (8),”

it is replied:

“If the coming into being of this latter will were due to that beginningless will, whose object must necessarily accompany it, that would be impossible, for the second will has come into being; it is therefore impossible for it to—”