nonexistence] (1), and is then described as self-sufficient and existent. But how can that which has always been existent and self-sufficient be described as dependent and contingent? If dependence, contingency, and receptivity to nonexistence are predicated of the existent, self-sufficient thing, that would be impossible in its case—as stated above—since it does not admit of nonexistence whatsoever. If they are predicated of what is in the mind, in the sense (2) that its existence in external reality requires an agent, this confirms what we have said: it must first be nonexistent and then be brought into existence.

If it is said:

“Rather, its agent conceives it within himself while continuously producing it, and the contingent is what is in the mind.”

It may be answered:

“The thing in the mind, being necessary, is necessary through its agent and admits of no nonexistence; and what exists in external reality is necessary through its agent and admits of no nonexistence. Where, then, is that which admits of both existence and nonexistence?”

If it is said:

“What is conceived in the mind admits of existence and nonexistence in external reality.”

It may be answered:

“This is impossible given the necessity of its existing [always] (3) in external reality. Rather, this is conceivable in the case of something that is nonexistent at one time and exists at another. Thus, if everything other than Allah is contingent and dependent, it must exist at one time and be nonexistent at another (4).”

This proof is firmly rooted in people’s innate dispositions. Anyone who conceives of anything as needing Allah and dependent upon Him—not existing through itself, but existing through Allah—conceives it as created, having come to be after it had not existed.

But if it is said:

“It is dependent, made, and in need, yet it has always been with Him and did not come into being after nonexistence,”

this cannot be rationally grasped or conceived except in the manner in which