Or it may be said:

“The existence of a thing in external reality is additional to its essence.”

If the former position is adopted, the world would have no entity in external reality other than what actually exists (1) in external reality, such that this entity could be said to admit of either existence or nonexistence.

If the latter position is adopted, then if (2) it is supposed that the entity has always existed, its essence would never have been in a state of admitting either existence or nonexistence; rather, it would always have been characterized by existence.

Thus, to say:

“The contingent is that which admits of either existence or nonexistence,”

while also saying that it has always existed, is to combine two contradictory assertions.

Likewise, if it is said:

“It is contingent when considered in itself,”

this statement is also contradictory, whether by “itself” one means existence (3) in external reality or some other entity that admits of existence in external reality. For if that entity has always existed and its existence is necessary, it cannot admit of nonexistence at all, nor can its nonexistence be possible in any respect.

To say:

“Considered in itself, it is nonexistent,”

while also saying:

“[It] (4) has always existed,”

amounts to saying that the essence has always existed, is necessary through another, and that its nonexistence is impossible, yet, considered in itself, it admits of both existence and nonexistence, either of which is possible for it. This has been set out fully in the discussion of the contingent (5), as they themselves have elaborated it in its proper place.

This is clarified by the fact that the contingent is dependent: it does not exist through itself but is made to exist by another. There must therefore be something here that can be described as dependent and contingent [and as receptive to