and their peers were more learned in jurisprudence than the former group, while Ahmad shared in the expertise of both groups.

The leading authorities in both groups were among those whom Ahmad loved and who loved him. This was his relationship with al-Shāfiī, Abū Ubayd, and their peers among those with jurisprudential expertise in hadith, and with Yahyā ibn Maīn, Alī ibn al-Madīnī, and their peers among those with critical expertise in hadith.

Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj gave greater attention than Abū Dāwūd to sound hadith; Abū Dāwūd gave greater attention to jurisprudence; and al-Bukhārī gave attention to both.

The purpose here is not to discuss this at length. Rather, the point is that scholars specializing in hadith possess knowledge of the Messenger’s circumstances that others do not; they are the authorities in this field. A man may be truthful, know many hadiths, and transmit them extensively, yet not be among those concerned with distinguishing sound reports from unsound ones. Benefit may be drawn from what he transmits, for he is truthful and accurate; determining which reports are sound and which are unsound, however, is another field of knowledge. Such a man may nonetheless be a jurist qualified to exercise independent legal reasoning, and he may be a righteous man among the finest Muslims, yet still lack extensive expertise in hadith.

Although these authorities vary in knowledge, they are not taken in by the kinds of falsehood that deceive those who lack their knowledge(1). The greater a person’s knowledge of the Messenger, the more complete his ability to distinguish truth from falsehood. Many hadiths may gain acceptance among specialists in Quranic exegesis, jurisprudence, asceticism, and rational inquiry: they either accept them as true or consider that they may be true, even though hadith scholars know them to be false.

Some of these people may even accept as true what the experts know to be false(2), such as what