in the future—or was once nonexistent—it cannot be beginningless and everlasting, [eternal] (1), and perpetually necessary through another, as these people claim regarding the world.

If what is meant by its admitting existence and nonexistence is that it admits both in the same state, this is impossible. If what is meant is that it admits them in two different states (2)—that is, it admits existence at one time and nonexistence at another (3)—then it cannot be beginningless and everlasting, since existence and nonexistence would alternate upon it. If what is meant is that its essence, which admits existence and nonexistence, is something other than its existence in external reality, then that is not the thing itself.

If it is said:

“What is meant is that whatever one conceives in the mind may either come to exist in external reality or remain nonexistent, just like the things a person conceives in his mind,”

it is said:

This also demonstrates that contingency necessarily entails nonexistence. What you have described pertains only to something an agent conceives in his mind, which he may cause to exist in external reality or which may remain nonexistent. This can only be conceived of something that is nonexistent at one time and exists at another. As for that which has always existed and has been necessary (4) through another, contingency cannot be conceived of it at all. If someone were to say, “Its essence admits existence and nonexistence,” he would be saying something unintelligible.

Astute speculative thinkers have recognized this point. Some rejected this doctrine of Avicenna and his followers, as Averroes did. Others, such as al-Rāzī and his followers, formulated it as a series of objections to the concept of the contingent, but they did not answer it (5) correctly.