the possibility of a thing by saying that, if its existence were posited, no impossibility would follow from it—is merely an assertion. The most he can say is:

“We do not know that any impossibility would follow from it.”

Yet the absence of [knowledge] (1) is not knowledge of absence (2). Thus, if these people wish to establish the possibility that an effect is inseparable from its agent, they must know either that this actually occurs in external reality or that something than which it has an even stronger claim to possibility actually occurs. Neither is the case. No agent is ever known except one who brings about his act or effect (3), not one whose determinate effect coexists with him and remains inseparable from him. Rather, this is closer (4) to denying that he is an agent and describing him as incapable of preventing what necessarily accompanies him than to affirming that he is an agent possessed of power. They have thereby ascribed an evil likeness to Allah, and this is false.

With regard to divine proofs (5), one must follow this method. It should be known that the Creator has a greater claim to every perfection possessed by a created being, for the perfection of a created being derives from the perfection of its Creator—or, in their terminology, the perfection of the effect derives from the perfection of its cause. Moreover, because the Necessary is more perfect than the contingent, He has a greater claim than every contingent being to every possible perfection that entails no deficiency. It should likewise be known that the Creator has a greater claim to be free of every deficiency from which any created being is free. Deficiency contradicts perfection; therefore, if He has a greater claim to the affirmation of perfection, He also has a greater claim to the negation of deficiency. This proposition is demonstrative and certain, and they concede it.

They also say:

“Action is an attribute of perfection,”

and they refute those among—