is the weakest of all such implications. For this reason, the great majority of scholars of legal theory and jurisprudence hold that it may not be adduced as evidence. Thus, if one says, “Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah,” this does not deny messengerhood to others. If, however, something in the context requires an exclusive sense, then, according to the correct view, this implication may be adduced as evidence.

Examples are His words:

“We gave Solomon insight into the matter”

(Surah al-Anbiyā: 79),

and His words:

“No indeed! On that Day they will be screened off from their Lord”

(Surah al-Mutaffifīn: 15).

If, however, someone is singled out for a reason that calls for it, no such inference may be adduced, by universal agreement. This (1) is such a case: he singled Alī out for mention only because Alī came out to him weeping and complaining (2) about being left behind with the women and children.

As for those other than Alī whom he appointed as his deputies, because they did not imagine that being appointed as a deputy involved any deficiency, he had no need to tell them anything of this kind. Singling someone out for mention, when there is a reason calling for it, does not entail that the ruling applies exclusively to him. Thus, the hadith does not indicate that no one else stood in relation to him as Aaron stood in relation to Moses.

This is just as when he said to the man who had been beaten, whom he forbade people to curse:

“Leave him, for he loves Allah and His Messenger” (3).

This did not indicate that no one else loved Allah and His Messenger. Rather, he mentioned it because there was a need to do so, thereby preventing people from cursing him.

Likewise, the report, “Umar—may Allah be pleased with him—asked the Prophet for permission to kill Hātib ibn Abī Balta'a, and he replied, ‘Leave him, for he had been present at Badr’” (4), did not indicate that no one else had been present at Badr. Rather, he mentioned the grounds that warranted the forgiveness of his sin.