of those who maintain the world’s eternity. With (1) the affirmation of the attributes and the acts that subsist in Him, the utter invalidity of their proofs—and indeed of their position itself—becomes clear, even [though] (2) denying the attributes points more strongly to the invalidity of his own position than to that of his opponents.

Yet Ibn Sīnā was raised among (the theologians who denied the attributes; Ibn Rushd was raised among the Kullābiyya; and Abū al-Barakāt was raised in Baghdad among) (3) the scholars of the Sunnah [and hadith] (4). Thus, each of them was distant from the truth to the extent that he was distant from knowledge of the teachings transmitted from the Messengers, and close to the truth to the extent that he was close to such knowledge.

These philosophers regarded what the theologians said concerning the temporal origination of the world as false, and believed that if they refuted the theologians’ position, their own would remain standing. They left the assertion of the perpetuity of agency ambiguous, just as the theologians had left ambiguous their assertion:

“Whatever does not precede temporal events is itself temporally originated.”

The theologians’ position therefore had the consequence [that] (5) many who heard it deemed it impossible for the Lord [Most High] (6) always to have been one who speaks whenever He wills, since no distinction was made between the kind in general and a particular instance. The philosophers’ position, in turn, led many [of those who] (7) heard it to suppose that the celestial sphere, or some part of the world, is eternal, since here too no distinction was made between the kind in general and a particular instance.