A group of scholars said:

“If someone attached a ruling to ‘the most ignorant of people,’ it would apply to the Rāfidah—for example, if he were to swear, ‘I hate the most ignorant of people,’ or something similar. However, if he bequeathed something to the most ignorant of people, the bequest would be invalid, because a bequest may only be made as an act of devotion. If he bequeathed something to a group that included an unbeliever, it would be valid. This is unlike making disbelief and ignorance the basis and condition for entitlement.”

The Rāfidī then claims that something is among Ali’s merits, although it may not be so. He next claims that this merit belongs to no one else, although it may be one of the merits shared by others. Indeed, most of Ali’s established merits (1) were shared by him and others. This is unlike the merits of Abū Bakr and Umar, most of which were exclusive distinctions that no one else shared with them. He then claims that this merit necessarily entails the imamate, whereas it is well known that excellence in one particular respect does not entail either absolute superiority or the imamate, nor is it exclusive to the imam (2). Rather, it may belong to the imam and to others, and to one who is superior overall and to one who is not.

Thus, this Rāfidī based (3) his case on these three premises, all three of which are false (4). He then follows them with a fourth premise, which is disputed. We, however, do not dispute it with him; rather, we concede that whoever is superior has a greater right to the imamate. Yet the Rāfidī has no proof for that (5).