anything else, for in their view nothing in the way of attributes or acts subsists in the First, nor does He have any varying states whatsoever. How, then, can it be conceived (1) that the second should proceed from Him after its proceeding from Him had been impossible, while His state remained exactly as it was and nothing new occurred except a merely privative circumstance that gave Him no increase in power, will, knowledge, or anything else?

This is unlike (2) the example they give of the motion of a human being and of other things that move (3), whether by volition or (4) by nature. When something moving has traversed the [first] stretch (5), it acquires a capacity that it did not possess (6) before, and a will arises in it that was not present before. A person experiences this within himself when walking: he finds himself incapable of traversing a distant stretch until he reaches it. Before reaching it, he is resolved to traverse it once he arrives; in this (7) state, however, he does not will to traverse it in this (8) state. Once he reaches it, he comes to will and be able to traverse it. Whenever firm will and complete capacity are present, the object willed must come into existence. The stretch is then traversed, not merely because the motion by which the first stretch was traversed has ceased, but because of the capacity and will that have newly arisen in him. Thus, what necessitates this (9) newly arisen factor is the universal will within him