it followed from a universal conception and a universal will. Then, according to your view, those conceptions, wills, and motions arise with absolutely no originator [for them] (1), because, in your view, there is nothing in the Necessarily Existent that could necessitate any temporal act whatsoever. Rather, His state before, after, and during the temporal event is the same. For an agent to bring about diverse temporal events while remaining in exactly the same state before, after, and during them (2 is even more implausible than his bringing about a single temporal event while remaining in exactly the same state before, after, and during it 2) (2).

If it is said, “His act changes because the effects change,” the reply is: If, according to you, His act is identical with the effects—as Ibn Sīnā and others like him among the Jahmī philosophers who deny attributes and acts maintain—then the things that change are those separate from Him, namely the effects. There is no act here distinct from them that may be described as changing. What, then, necessitates their changing and differing, and the occurrence of whatever among them occurs, although [it is the case that] (3) the agent remains in one and the same state?! The invalidity (4) of this is more evident to sound reason than the invalidity of what you condemned in others.

But if His act subsists in Him, as maintained by those who affirm volitional acts among the leading authorities of the religious communities [and among the philosophers] (5), both ancient and later, then it is well known that these acts are the sole cause (6) of the changes in the effects.