bringing the particular thing into being, and after bringing the particular thing into being, is the same, then bringing that particular thing into being would be impossible; consequently, it would be impossible for Him to bring anything into being (1).

Furthermore, His bringing the first into being would be no more warranted than His bringing the second into being. Nor would specifying (* the first by its measure and characteristic be any more warranted than specifying the second, if no cause that necessitated such specification ever proceeded from the agent *) (2)—whether by a measure, a characteristic (3), or anything else.

They objected to those theorists who said, “He acted after not having been an agent” (4), [and they said, “Sound reason knows that anyone who acts after not having been an agent] (5) must necessarily undergo some new development: either acquiring power, will, or knowledge; the removal of an impediment; or the occurrence of some other cause.”

It may therefore be said to them: Sound reason likewise knows that anyone who brought about this temporal event after not having been its agent must necessarily undergo some new development constituting the cause that occasioned his action. You thus objected to others for affirming the commencement of action without a cause, while committing yourselves to the perpetual succession of temporal effects without a cause. What you have affirmed—the arising of temporal events without a cause—is therefore graver than what you denied. Indeed, your position entails that there is no (6) agent for temporal events to begin with; rather, they arise without any agent. For according to you, that which necessitates temporal events is the motion of the celestial sphere (7). The motion of the celestial sphere is a psychical motion, driven by the successive conceptions and volitions that arise within it, even if