The thirteenth argument (1) is this: It may be said: Does the infallibility attributed to the imam consist in his voluntarily performing acts of obedience and voluntarily refraining from sins, despite (2) the fact that, according to you, Allah Most High does not create his choice? Or does it consist in Allah creating the will in him? Or (3) in depriving him of the ability to sin?

If you adopt the first position—while maintaining that Allah does not create the choices of those who act—you are compelled to conclude that Allah is unable to create an infallible person.

If you adopt the second, then the principle concerning divine power that you espouse is invalidated.

If you say that he is deprived of the ability to sin, then [the infallible], according to you (4), is merely someone incapable of sinning—just as a blind person is incapable of adding diacritical dots to Quranic manuscripts and a person unable to walk is incapable of walking.

A person incapable of something is neither forbidden to do it nor commanded to do it. If he is neither commanded nor forbidden, he merits no reward for obedience. Thus, according to you, the infallible receives no reward for refraining from sin—indeed (5), not even for performing an act of obedience. This is the utmost deficiency.

Accordingly, any Muslim who sinned and then repented would be better than this infallible person, for through repentance his evil deeds would be erased; indeed, each evil deed would be replaced with a good deed, in addition to his previous good deeds. Those subject to divine commands and prohibitions would therefore, by virtue of their reward, be better than the infallible person according to these people. This contradicts their position in the most extreme manner.