that is other than Him and whose action depends on nothing else outside Himself—neither preparation (1), provision, receptivity, nor anything else; rather, His very being necessarily entails His action—if He were assumed to be a complete, eternal cause, His entire effect would necessarily accompany Him, and nothing He brings about (2) could lag behind Him. If anything He brings about did lag behind Him, even if it were brought about through an intermediary, it would be known that He had not been its complete cause in eternity and that He became a cause after not having been one.

If it is said, “The motion of the celestial sphere is the cause of temporal events coming into being,” the reply is:

This too is known to be false. It is impossible for that which necessitates a motion that comes into being successively (3) to be a complete, eternal cause. The effect of such a cause would accompany it from all eternity and forever, whereas a motion that comes into being successively cannot have accompanied its cause in eternity. It is therefore known that what necessitates its coming into being is not a complete, eternal cause. Rather, the Lord must be characterized by acts that subsist in Him successively; by reason of (4) what subsists in Him, whatever proceeds from Him comes into being—such as His will that subsists in His Essence, His words that subsist in His Essence, and His voluntary acts that subsist in His Essence.

Another point is that the temporal events occurring thereafter must have someone who brings them into being, and it is impossible for anyone other than Him to bring them into being, for there is no Lord besides Him. Moreover, the same argument regarding that other agent in relation to the event applies as it did to Him: either the agent was a complete cause in eternity or it was not, and the same division recurs.

If they say, “The second event was delayed only because the emergence of the receptacles and the conditions through which the emanation is received was delayed,”