comes into being would not be [its effect, for if it were its effect], the effect (1), or part of the effect, would have lagged behind its complete cause. Yet neither its effect nor any part of its effect can lag behind a complete cause. Thus, nothing that comes into being can arise from a complete, eternal cause. According to them, however, the Necessary Existent is a complete, eternal cause. It therefore follows that no temporal event can arise from Him, either through an intermediary or without one (2).
The excuse they offer here—namely, their claim that temporal events were delayed only because preparedness and the like were delayed—is among the most untenable assertions. This can be said only where the cause of a thing’s existence differs from the cause of its preparedness and receptivity (3), as with what is produced by the sun. At times, the sun softens and moistens, as when it softens fruits after their dryness (4), because of the moisture that develops within them. Their watery moisture then combines with the sun’s heat, causing the fruits to ripen and soften. At other times, the sun dries and desiccates, as happens to fruits after they have reached full ripeness: their replenishment with moisture ceases, leaving heat to act upon moisture without further replenishment and thus dry it out, just as the sun, fire, and other agents dry other moist bodies.
The point is that, in such cases, the agent’s action may be delayed because the receptacle is not yet prepared. If the Active Intellect they posit were a reality, the delay of its emanation until the receptacles became prepared would fall into this category. But as for the Necessary Existent, who brings into being all—