so they say, “Such-and-such is obligatory for Him, so He must have done what was obligatory.” This is all the argument amounts to.

Yet the actual state of affairs may be known through many definitive and certain means, all of which show the absence of what they claim actually exists. If we know conclusively that the intended benefit is absent, we cannot establish its necessary concomitant, namely the means. For we establish a necessary concomitant by establishing that which entails it; but when we know conclusively that the latter is absent, its necessary concomitant cannot be established.

We may then challenge the claim of obligation both in general and in detail, or say (1): The overall obligation (2) does not depend upon the infallible person they allege, unless the same were found among Muāwiya’s deputies (3).

The Rāfidites’ assertion (4) belongs to the same class as the Christians’ claim: “God became incarnate and descended, and He sent down His Son to be crucified, so that the crucifixion would bring forgiveness for Adam’s sin and He would thereby ward Satan off from them.”

They were told:

“If killing him, crucifying him, and declaring him a liar are among the gravest evils and acts of disobedience, He would have sought to remove a lesser sin by means of a sin greater than it. Moreover, He still would not have eliminated evil; rather, He would have increased what already existed. How, then, could He do something for a particular end when the actual result is precisely the opposite of that end?!”

The fifth point:

If human beings are social by nature, and if it was only necessary to appoint