others.

One view holds that retaliatory execution is required only for the direct perpetrator. This is the position of Abū Hanīfa.

Another view holds that when the causal contribution is substantial, both the direct perpetrator and the person who caused the act are liable, as in the case of one who coerces another and the person coerced, or witnesses who testify in cases of adultery or retaliation, then retract their testimony and say, “We did so deliberately.” This is the position of the majority, including Mālik, al-Shāfiī, and Ahmad.

Furthermore, if one person restrains the victim while another kills him, Mālik holds that both the person who restrained him and the killer (1) are liable to retaliatory execution. This is one of the two reports from Ahmad. According to the other report, the killer is put to death, while the person who restrained the victim is imprisoned (2) until he dies, as is related from Ibn Abbās. It has also been held that only the killer is liable to retaliatory execution, which is the position of Abū Hanīfa and al-Shāfiī.

They also differed concerning a person who gives an order without coercion: if he orders someone who believes killing to be forbidden, is the person who gave the order liable to retaliatory execution? There are two views.

As for a supporting accomplice in an offense requiring assistance, such as highway robbery, the majority hold that the prescribed penalty applies to both the accomplice and the direct perpetrator. This is the position of Abū Hanīfa, Mālik, and Ahmad. Umar [ibn al-Khattāb] (3) used to order the execution of the lookout (4)—that is, the highway robbers’ watchman (5).