concerning a particular temporally originated thing—is contingent upon a will for it and upon a will for the temporally originated thing preceding it, and that the creating agent has never ceased willing each object of will that comes into existence.

This is the second supposition, namely, to say:

If He were to will to bring about (1) one thing after another, every object of His will would be temporally originated, coming into being after not having existed. (2 He alone is uniquely possessed of eternity and beginninglessness, while everything besides Him is created and temporally originated, coming into being after not having existed 2) (2) On this supposition, this entails nothing beyond the perpetuity and succession of temporally originated things. This is the [supposition] (3) that we have discussed. It necessarily entails that whatever the agent wills and has power to do subsists in his essence. This is the position of the leading authorities of Ahl al-Hadīth and of many scholars of kalām and philosophy; indeed, it is the position of their foremost figures among both the earlier and later generations.

It has thus become clear that everything besides Allah must be held to be temporally originated, whether it is called a body, an intellect, or a soul. Nothing of this kind can be eternal, whether one holds that the perpetuity and succession of temporally originated things is possible and that they have no beginning, or holds that this is impossible; and whether one holds that a temporally originated thing necessarily requires a temporally originated cause, or holds that this is impossible. The position of those who maintain that the world—such as the celestial spheres, intellects, and souls—is eternal is therefore false according to plain reason, which has never proved false, under every supposition. This is what was to be demonstrated.

[Digression: The temporal origination and eternity of Allah’s actions and speech—an issue over which the leading figures of the various schools have clashed]

The matters connected with this have been discussed at length elsewhere. For this is the [principle] (4) over which the leading figures of the various schools have clashed, including the adherents of—