upon among rational people, since this would entail that everything proceeding from Him, whether through an intermediary or without one, is eternal and beginningless. It would therefore follow that nothing ever comes into existence in the world. This contradicts what created beings witness of events coming into existence in the heavens, on earth, and between them—including the origination of motions, entities, and accidents, such as the motion of the sun, moon, and stars; the movement of the winds; clouds and rain; and the animals, plants (1), and minerals that come into existence.

As for a will concerning a particular thing, its impossibility follows from what has already been stated, as well as from the following: either it is said that He has only that eternal will, or that He has wills (2) which arise one after another.

If the first is maintained, then it (3) follows, on this supposition, that the eternal willing agent coexisted from eternity with the eternal object of His will. He would therefore will none of the temporally originated things, whether by the eternal will or by any renewed will. For if it is assumed that the eternal willing agent must coexist with the object of His will, then a temporally originated thing would arise either through an eternal will—in which case the willing agent would not coexist with the object of His will—or through a temporally originated will concomitant with it.

This is false for two reasons:

First, the supposition is that He has only one eternal will.

Second, the origination of that will would require a temporally originated cause. The same argument that applies to any other temporally originated thing applies to that temporally originated [cause] (4): it cannot arise through the eternal will, which entails that its object coexist with it; nor can it arise without a will, since it is impossible for a temporally originated thing to arise without a will. It must therefore follow, on this supposition, that the will—