that was white became distinct from the black thread, because they had erred in their interpretation.

Nor did he punish Usāmah ibn Zayd when he killed the man who said, “There is no deity but Allah,” because he thought it permissible to kill him, believing that the man had said it merely to protect himself.

Likewise, he did not punish the members of the expedition that killed the man who said he was a Muslim and took his property, because they had acted on an interpretive judgment.

Likewise, when Khālid ibn al-Walīd killed Banū Jadhīmah after they said, “We have left our former religion,” he did not punish him because of his interpretive judgment.

Similarly, al-Siddīq did not punish Khālid for killing Mālik ibn Nuwayrah, because Khālid had acted on an interpretive judgment.

Likewise, when one Companion said to another, “You are a hypocrite,” the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—did not punish him, because he had acted on an interpretive judgment (1).

For this reason, the jurists stated that a prescribed penalty is waived either because of a mistaken belief in permissibility or because of ambiguity concerning ownership. Thus, if a man contracts a marriage that he believes to be lawful and consummates it, he is not subjected to the prescribed penalty, even if the union is in fact unlawful. By contrast, if he knew that the act was forbidden but did not know its punishment, the prescribed penalty is carried out against him.

Thus, the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—carried out the prescribed penalty against Māiz ibn Mālik, for Māiz knew that illicit sex was forbidden, but he did not know that a married adulterer was to be stoned. The Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—therefore stoned him because he knew the act was forbidden, even though he did not know that he would be punished