it exists. It would then follow that every possible thing exists, and this is necessarily known by [reason] (1) to be false.

If it is objected, “What is meant is that (2) a possible thing can exist only through an agent,” the response is: In that case, possibility together with existence would entail dependence upon an agent. They would then need to show that it is possible for (3) the existence of a possible thing to be beginningless, and that an agent can have its particular effect be beginningless. If you establish this, you will have no need for what preceded, for a possible thing’s dependence upon an agent is established only while it exists. It is thus known that arguing from mere possibility is invalid.

[The Tenth Demonstration and the Response to It]

Al-Rāzī said:

(The tenth demonstration: The basis of dependence must not persist in the presence of the efficient cause as it did in its absence; otherwise, even in the presence of the efficient cause, the need for another efficient cause would remain. If we were to make origination the basis of dependence upon an efficient cause, origination in the presence of the efficient cause would be the same as it is [without] (4) the efficient cause. For (5) origination is existence after nonexistence. Whether (6) that existence is brought about by an agent or not, it remains existence after nonexistence. Whether (7) it is considered (8) in the state of origination or in the state of persistence, in both cases it is existence after nonexistence. Thus, it is [with] (9) the efficient cause just as it is without the