is through something other than them. If this necessity is inseparable (1) from the quiddity, and necessity precludes dependence upon another, then what is inseparable from the quiddity would preclude it from such dependence. The beginningless quiddity would therefore remain forever precluded from depending upon another (2), and consequently could never depend upon another. This is precisely what the great majority of rational people maintain: whatever is beginningless (3) cannot be an effect.

Tenth: If it is assumed that possibility is what makes a thing dependent upon another (4) that exercises causal efficacy, such efficacy consists in making the thing existent and originating its existence. Making (5) something whose nonexistence is possible actually exist can only be conceived as bringing it into existence after it had not existed. Otherwise, one cannot conceive of something whose existence has been necessary from eternity and whose nonexistence is impossible as needing someone to make it existent.

If they say, “It is necessarily existent from eternity and forever (6), and its nonexistence is impossible,” while also saying, “Another originated it and made it existent, and both its existence and nonexistence are possible,” then they have combined in their statements a contradiction greater than any they mention concerning (7) others.

Eleventh: If mere possibility necessarily entailed dependence upon an agent, then every possible thing would exist. Likewise, when we say, “Origination is what gives rise to dependence upon an efficient cause,” every originated thing is existent. For (8) a thing dependent upon an agent needs it only when the agent brings that thing about; if, by supposition, the agent does not bring it about, it has no need for the agent. But if the agent does bring it about, it necessarily follows that