Minhaj as-SunnahIbn Taimiya

in itself. This is analogous to color: when considered in abstraction, it neither entails blackness nor precludes it. Likewise, animal, when considered in abstraction, neither entails rationality nor precludes it. The same applies to all other general concepts that function like genera: when considered without regard to some of their species, they would not (1) entail them or preclude them.

Fourth: The statement,

(“Origination, insofar as it is origination, precludes any need for a cause”)

(2) is known to be false by self-evident reason. Indeed, its falsity is more evident than the falsity of the statement that possibility, insofar as it is possibility, precludes any need for a cause. For people know more evidently and clearly that whatever came into being after not having existed must have an originator than they know that whatever admits (3) existence and nonexistence must have a preponderating cause. Thus, if the argument denying the latter is sophistical, the former has an even greater claim to be sophistical.

Fifth: This argument rests upon the claim that, in external reality, there is a quiddity distinct from the existence realized in external reality, and that (4) existence and nonexistence successively befall it. This is not conceded and is false.

Sixth: Even if that were conceded, a quiddity considered in itself warrants neither existence nor nonexistence, nor does it depend upon an agent. For those who hold this view say that quiddities are not produced and that (5) what is produced is their being qualified (6) by existence. They depend upon an agent only when they are

(1) A and B read: “be made [to entail it].” (2) This is the reading in all the manuscripts at this point. However, the words “for a cause” do not occur in every manuscript, as noted above. (3) A and B read: “admits [both existence and nonexistence].” (4) A and B read: “and that.” (5) A and B read: “but rather.” (6) N and M read: “also therein,” which is a corruption.
بِنَفْسِهِ، وَصَارَ هَذَا كَاللَّوْنِ إِذَا أُخِذَ مُجَرَّدًا لَا يَسْتَلْزِمُ السَّوَادَ، وَلَا يَنْفِيهِ، وَالْحَيَوَانُ إِذَا أُخِذَ مُجَرَّدًا لَا يَسْتَلْزِمُ النُّطْقَ. وَلَا يَنْفِيهِ، وَكَذَلِكَ سَائِرُ الْمَعَانِي الْعَامَّةِ الَّتِي تَجْرِي مَجْرَى الْأَجْنَاسِ إِذَا أُخِذَتْ مَعَ قَطْعِ النَّظَرِ عَنْ بَعْضِ الْأَنْوَاعِ لَمْ تَكُنْ (١) مُسْتَلْزِمَةً لِذَلِكَ، وَلَا مَانِعَةً مِنْهُ. الرَّابِعُ: أَنَّ قَوْلَ الْقَائِلِ: (الْحُدُوثُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ حُدُوثٌ مَانِعٌ عَنِ الْحَاجَةِ إِلَى الْمُؤَثِّرِ) (٢) مِمَّا يُعْلَمُ فَسَادُهُ بِبَدِيهَةِ الْعَقْلِ، وَالْعِلْمُ بِفَسَادِ ذَلِكَ أَظْهَرُ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ بِفَسَادِ قَوْلِ مَنْ يَقُولُ الْإِمْكَانُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ إِمْكَانٌ مَانِعٌ عَنِ الْحَاجَةِ إِلَى الْمُؤَثِّرِ، فَإِنَّ عِلْمَ النَّاسِ بِأَنَّ مَا حَدَثَ بَعْدَ أَنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ لَا بُدَّ لَهُ مِنْ مُحْدِثٍ أَظْهَرُ، وَأَبْيَنُ مِنْ عِلْمِهِمْ بِأَنَّ مَا قَبْلَ (٣) الْوُجُودِ وَالْعَدَمِ لَا بُدَّ لَهُ مِنْ مُرَجِّحٍ، فَإِذَا كَانَتِ الْحُجَّةُ النَّافِيَةُ لِهَذَا سُوفُسْطَائِيَّةً، فَتِلْكَ أَوْلَى أَنْ تَكُونَ سُوفُسْطَائِيَّةً. الْخَامِسُ: أَنَّ هَذِهِ الْحُجَّةَ مَبْنِيَّةٌ عَلَى أَنَّ فِي الْخَارِجِ مَاهِيَّةً غَيْرَ الْوُجُودِ الْحَاصِلِ فِي الْخَارِجِ، وَأَنَّهُ (٤) يَعْتَقِبُ عَلَيْهَا الْوُجُودُ وَالْعَدَمُ، وَهَذَا مَمْنُوعٌ وَبَاطِلٌ. السَّادِسُ: أَنَّهُ لَوْ سَلَّمَ ذَلِكَ، فَالْمَاهِيَّةُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هِيَ هِيَ لَا تَسْتَحِقُّ وُجُودًا وَلَا عَدَمًا، وَلَا تَفْتَقِرُ إِلَى فَاعِلٍ، فَإِنَّ مَنْ يَقُولُ ذَلِكَ يَقُولُ الْمَاهِيَّاتُ غَيْرُ مَجْعُولَةٍ وَأَنَّ (٥) الْمَجْعُولَ اتِّصَافُهَا (٦) بِالْوُجُودِ، وَإِنَّمَا تَفْتَقِرُ إِلَى الْفَاعِلِ إِذَا كَانَتْ
(١) أ، ب: تُجْعَلْ. (٢) كَذَا فِي جَمِيعِ النُّسَخِ فِي هَذَا الْمَوْضِعِ، وَ (إِلَى الْمُؤَثِّرِ) لَيْسَتْ فِي النُّسَخِ كُلِّهَا، كَمَا تَقَدَّمَ. (٣) أ، ب: يَقْبَلُ. (٤) أ، ب: وَأَنَّ. (٥) أ، ب: وَإِنَّمَا. (٦) ن، م: أَيْضًا فِيهَا، وَهُوَ تَحْرِيفٌ.

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