in existence. Thus origination comprises this meaning, or entails it. If origination comprises dependence upon an agent [or] (1) entails dependence upon an agent, it cannot be said to preclude that dependence, for a thing does not preclude its own necessary consequence (2); it precludes only its opposite.

Third: His statement, “What is necessary, insofar as it is (3) necessary, cannot depend upon a cause,” is not conceded. Rather, it is only what is necessary in itself that cannot depend (4) upon a cause. As for what is necessary through another, it can depend upon a cause; indeed, its very being necessary through another comprises and entails its dependence upon a cause. How, then, can it be said that necessity through another precludes dependence upon another?

If he says, “I mean what is necessary insofar as it is necessary, without considering whether it is necessary in itself or through another,”

it is said to him: In external reality, there is only what is necessary in itself or what is necessary through another. If it is considered without either qualification (5), it is something posited in the mind and does not exist as a concrete entity.

It is further said: We do not concede that, when what is necessary is considered without qualification, it cannot depend upon a cause. Rather, when considered without qualification, what is necessary does not entail a cause [nor does it negate (* a cause] (6), for some necessary things entail a cause—namely, what is necessary through another—whereas some negate it—namely, what is *) (7) necessary