were necessary under both descriptions, then the quiddity, considered in itself, would be necessary and would not depend upon a cause. For what is necessary (1), insofar as it is necessary, cannot depend (2) upon a cause. Thus (3), origination, insofar as it is origination, precludes the need for a cause. If the quiddity is not (4) considered simply in itself, the necessity is not removed—namely, the necessity of existence at the time of its existence and the necessity of nonexistence at the time of its nonexistence. Considered in this way, it [does not] (5) need a cause. We therefore know that origination, insofar as it is origination, precludes the need for a cause; it is contingency alone that gives rise to that need).

The response is that this argument contains several fallacies and may be answered in several ways.

First, it may be said: Grant that while it exists, it is necessarily existent; nevertheless, it is necessarily existent through another. That [does not] (6) conflict with its dependence upon an agent, as something produced by that agent and originated after not having existed. If (7) this necessity does not preclude anything (8) that entails its dependence upon the agent, then its dependence upon the agent together with this necessity is not impossible.

Second, regarding his statement, “Origination consists in these two states occurring in succession,” it may be said to him: Origination includes these two states, but it also includes the fact that the thing came into existence through an agent who brought it into existence—an agent upon whom it depends and without whose act of bringing it into existence it would not exist—after it had not been