for whoever produces that which entails the concomitant also produces its necessary concomitant; that which entails it is therefore not the efficient cause of its concomitant.
As for their statement:
“This necessitation is one of the triangle’s necessary concomitants,”
if by “necessitation” and “causation” they mean entailment, then this is true, but it affords them no proof. If they mean that it is an efficient cause (1), this is manifestly false.
As for causes and effects that exist extramentally, as in the case of a disordered temperament and pain, who has conceded that they occur at the same time?
Those advancing this argument have themselves said in their proof that pain occurs immediately after the disordered temperament. Whatever occurs immediately after something exists subsequent to it. At most, it follows without any interval; it does not, however, coexist with it in time. For something that coexists with another thing in time is not said to [only] (2) occur immediately after it.
The same applies to all causes: we do not concede that the time when each of them exists is the same as the time when its effect exists. Rather, there must be temporal priority (3). The same holds for breaking and breakage, and for burning and combustion. Breaking is the breaker’s act, which subsists in him, like the motion that subsists in a person; breakage, however, is the separation that occurs in the broken object. This takes place through motion over a period of time, and it is evident that the time of that motion precedes the time of this separation. One period of time may, however, be contiguous with another, and that which is contiguous is said to be “with” it. Yet there is a difference between [two things whose time is one and the same] (4) and two things whose times occur successively.
Some causes produce their effects gradually; when the cause reaches completion, its effect likewise reaches completion. Examples include eating and drinking in relation to satiety, the quenching of thirst, and intoxication. Thus, whenever part of