the two contradictories arises from it, then this is true. However, it does not follow that either precedes the other.

Yet they say, “Its nonexistence precedes its existence,” even though it has always existed. You thus know that, despite their claim that the contingent is eternal and beginningless, it is impossible for any nonexistence to precede its existence in any respect. Their discourse merely combines contradictories in this and similar matters; such contradictions abound in their writings.

The contingency affirmed by most rational people, however—and by their ancient authorities, Aristotle and his followers—is the possibility that a thing may exist or not exist. This contingency is genuinely preceded by nonexistence, for every contingent thing is originated, coming into existence after not having existed. A fuller discussion of these [matters] belongs (1) elsewhere.

The point here is that they corrupted the revealed proofs by introducing Qarmatian esotericism into them and distorting words from their proper meanings, just as they corrupted the rational proofs (2) by introducing sophistry into them, inverting the true nature of intelligible realities, and altering the natural disposition upon which Allah created mankind. For this reason, they employ ambiguous and equivocal terms, since these lend themselves more readily to deception and obfuscation—terms such as “causal influence” and “dependence”—so that they may say: “It has been established that (3) whatever, considered in itself, is possible in existence may (4) derive from an efficient cause that exists eternally alongside its effect.”

Yet in the original case on which they based their analogy, what they mean, according to their doctrine, is a privation necessarily entailed by His existence; whereas in the analogical branch, they mean something brought into being by an originator and created by a creator. What resemblance is there between one kind of dependence and the other, or between one kind of causal influence and the other?

The ninth response (5): It may be said that the true substance of this argument is a bare syllogism based on an analogy—