and in one’s beloved as to lose awareness of one’s love, and in one’s object of worship as to lose awareness of one’s worship, and so forth. Similarly, one may conceive of a thing as being contrary to what it actually is, as when one imagines that a mountain is made of ruby and the sea of mercury. To conceive of things as being contrary to what they actually are is to posit false beliefs.

False beliefs do not (1) exist anywhere except in minds. Thus, whoever supposes a quiddity that is neither in the mind nor in external reality is like someone who supposes an existent that is neither necessary nor possible, neither eternal nor originated, and neither subsisting by itself nor subsisting in another. This supposition is itself in the mind.

We have discussed this at length when demonstrating the invalidity of the way many speculative thinkers infer possibilities in external reality from mental suppositions, as al-Rāzī and others do. They say:

“An existent is either within the universe, outside the universe, or neither within nor outside it; and every (2) existent is either separate from another existent, co-located with it, or neither separate nor co-located. This indicates that the third category is possible.

“Likewise, if we say, ‘An existent is either spatially located, subsists in something spatially located, or is neither spatially located nor subsistent in something spatially located,’ this indicates that the [third] (3) category is possible.”

This is an error. It is just like someone saying, “An existent either subsists by itself, subsists in another, or neither subsists by itself nor in another,” and concluding from this that the third category is possible. That is an error.