, Abū al-Barakāt, and others, and that (1) one finds in their own words (2), as well as in some of their refutations of one another, material demonstrating that their division of the attributes necessarily belonging to a subject into these three categories is invalid—unless this division is made with reference to quiddity as conceived in the mind, rather than to a quiddity existing in external reality.

Likewise, they built upon this the claim that a human being is composed of genus and differentia. Yet this composition (3) is purely mental and has no reality externally. A human being’s composition from animal and rational is of the same kind as its composition from animal and capable of laughter, provided the latter two attributes (4) are treated as mutually necessary concomitants and both “capable of laughter” and “rational” are understood potentially (5).

But if it is said, “[In external reality] (6), a human being is composed of this and that,” and what is meant is that a human being is characterized by both, then this (7) is correct. It is likewise (8) correct to distinguish between the attributes necessarily belonging to a human being, without which one would not be human—such as animality, rationality, and the capacity for laughter—and attributes that occur only in some people, such as being black or white and Arab or non-Arab.

But if it is said, “It is composed of the attributes necessarily belonging to it, which are parts of it and are