concrete entities. Thus, whoever means by essence what is in the mind and by existence what is in the external world is correct in saying, “Existence is distinct from essence.” But if by essence he means what is in the external world, and by existence what is in the external world, and by essence what is in the mind, and by existence what is in the mind, yet claims that there are two things in the mind and two things in the external world—existence and essence—then he imagines (1) a notion that has no reality. This distinction dispels the confusion that arises here.

The term māhiyya (“essence”) is derived from the question mā huwa? (“What is it?”). “What is it?” is a question about what the respondent conceives so that he may answer concerning it, and that is the thing’s essence in itself. The meaning signified by an expression must correspond to that expression. Accordingly, the expression signifies it by correspondence; it signifies part of that meaning by inclusion; and it signifies a necessary concomitant of that meaning by implication (2).

Signification by correspondence is not the expression’s signification of that for which it was instituted, as some people suppose. Nor is signification (3) by inclusion the use of an expression for part of its meaning, nor is signification (4) by implication the use of an expression for a necessary concomitant of its meaning.

Rather, a distinction must be made between that for which the expression was instituted, what the speaker intends by the expression, and what the listener takes the expression to mean. Thus, when the speaker uses an expression to signify