its essence a state of requiring neither existence nor nonexistence. This non-requirement (1) is a privative attribute prior to requirement. Intrinsic origination was thereby established (2) from this perspective.”

It may be said:

This is a valid objection that demonstrates the invalidity of their position, even on the basis of the false premises he conceded to them. For this argument is based on the premise that a determinate entity in external reality is an essence capable of admitting existence and nonexistence, distinct from the existence established in external reality. This is false. It is [also] (3) based on the premise that the nonexistence of a contingent is caused by the nonexistence of its cause, which is likewise false.

As for the attempted defense that what is meant (4) is that it requires neither existence nor nonexistence by virtue of itself, it may be said:

If this is assumed to be what was meant, then it would in no respect require nonexistence. Its essence necessitates neither its existence nor its nonexistence. Rather, something other than it necessitated its existence but did not necessitate its nonexistence. Thus, unlike existence, nonexistence would neither arise from the thing itself nor from another existent. Its nonexistence would therefore in no respect precede its existence.

His statement, “Non-requirement (5) is a privative attribute,” is answered by saying that this privation is the absence of both contradictories—existence and nonexistence—not merely the absence of existence. Yet contradictories [cannot both be absent, just as] (6) they cannot both be present. It is therefore impossible to say [that] (7) the joint absence of both contradictories precedes (8) its existence. If what is meant is that neither one of—