the external world and may not exist.” What is meant by this is not that (1) the mental image itself exists identically in the external world. Rather, it means that what is conceived in the mind may exist in the external world, just as other instances of it exist there.

For example, a person (2) conceives of a house that he will build or a deed that he will perform. A man may say to another, “You have brought forth what I had in mind,” or, “You did this just as I had envisioned it.” Umar ibn al-Khattāb—may Allah be pleased with him—said, “I had formulated a speech in my mind, but Abu Bakr, speaking extemporaneously, came forth with something better.”

All of this is commonly understood, for a thing has an existence in itself, a representation corresponding [to it] (3) in knowledge, an expression denoting that cognitive representation, and a written form corresponding to that expression.

Thus, a thing is said to have an existence in concrete entities, in minds, on the tongue, and at the fingertips (4)—that is, concrete, cognitive, verbal, and written existence. Consider the existing sun and the existing Kaaba: when a person sees the sun, he forms a representation of it within himself. He then says with his tongue, “Sun” and “Kaaba,” and then writes in his own hand, “Sun” and “Kaaba.” If he writes these words and it is said, “This is the sun in the sky, and this is the Kaaba toward which the Muslims pray,” he does not mean that the writing itself is the sun or the Kaaba; the intended meaning is well known.

Likewise, when he says (5), “O Zayd,” the caller is not calling the sound. And when he says, “I struck